Wesay that, having no eyes, its stream of consciousness cannot containbrightness and color sensations as we know them - having no tastebuds this stream can contain no sensations of sweet, sour, saltand bitter. On this view, afterhaving determined our animal's ability to learn, the simplicityor complexity of its methods of learning, the effect of past habitupon present response, the range of stimuli to which it ordinarilyresponds, the widened range to which it can respond under experimentalconditions - in more general terms, its various problems andits various ways of solving them - we should still feel thatthe task is unfinished and that the results are worthless, untilwe can interpret them by analogy in the light of consciousness.Although we have solved our problem we feel uneasy and unrestfulbecause of our definition of psychology: we feel forced to saysomething about the possible mental processes of our animal. Should human psychologists fail to look with favor uponour overtures and refuse to modify their position, the behavioristswill be driven to using human beings as subjects and to employmethods of investigation which are exactly comparable to thosenow employed in the animal work.Īny other hypothesis than that which admits the independent valueof behavior material, regardless of any bearing such materialmay have upon consciousness, will inevitably force us to the absurd positionof attempting to construct the conscious content of theanimal whose behavior we have been studying. The enormous number of experiments which we have carriedout upon learning have likewise contributed little to human psychology.It seems reasonably clear that some kind of compromise must beaffected: either psychology must change its viewpoint so as totake in facts of behavior, whetheror not they have bearings upon the problems of 'consciousness' or else behavior must stand alone as a wholly separate and independentscience. We must frankly admit that the factsso important to us which we have been able to glean from extendedwork upon the senses of animals by the behavior method have contributedonly in a fragmentary way to the general theory of human senseorgan processes, nor have they suggested new points of experimentalattack. I hope that such a confession will clearthe atmosphere to such an extent that we will no longer have towork under false pretences. I was interested inmy own work and felt that it was important, and yet I could nottrace any close connection between it and psychology as my questionerunderstood psychology. Such scepticism is often shownby the question which is put to the student of behavior, 'whatis the bearing of animal workupon human psychology?' I used to have to study over this question.Indeed it always embarrassed me somewhat. Indeed, at times, one finds psychologists who are sceptical ofeven this analogical reference. 1 Such data must have at least an analogicalor indirect reference to belong to the realm of psychology. They possess significance only inso far as they may throw light upon conscious states. It is agreedthat introspection is the method par excellence by meansof which mental states may be manipulated for purposes of psychology.On this assumption, behavior data (including under this term everythingwhich goes under the name of comparative psychology)have no value per se. The problem in emotion is the determinationof the number and kind of elementary constituents present, theirloci, intensity, order of appearance, etc. The psychologicalobject of observation in the case of an emotion, for example,is the mental state itself. That end is the production ofmental states that may be 'inspected' or 'observed'. The world of physical objects (stimuli,including here anything which may excite activity in a receptor),which forms the total phenomena of the natural scientist, is lookedupon merely as means to an end.

It has been maintained by its followers generally thatpsychology is a study of the science of the phenomena of consciousness.It has taken as its problem, on the one hand, the analysis ofcomplex mental states (or processes) into simple elementary constituents,and on the other the construction of complex states when the elementaryconstituents are given. Thebehaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animalresponse, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute.The behavior of man, with all of its refinement and complexity,forms only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation.

Introspectionforms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientificvalue of its data dependent upon the readiness with which theylend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. Its theoretical goal is the predictionand control of behavior. Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimentalbranch of natural science. First published in Psychological Review, 20,158-177

Ivan pavlov pioneered the study of